At the pleading stage, however, the plaintiff need only set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8(a)(2). Id. at 508, 122 S.Ct. 992. Storey v. Burns Intern. Sec. Servs. 390 F.3d 760 (3d Cir. 2004)

A district court must accept any and all reasonable inferences derived from those facts. Unger v. Nat’l Residents Matching Program, 928 F.2d 1392 (3d Cir.1991); Glenside West Corp. v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 761 F. Supp. 1100, 1107 (D.N.J.1991); Gutman v. Howard Say. Bank, 748 F. Supp. 254, 260 (D.N.J.1990).

Further, the court must view all allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236, 94 S. Ct. 1683; Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir.1994).

It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead evidence, and it is not necessary to plead the facts that serve as the basis for the claim. See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir.1977); In re Midlantic Corp. Shareholder Litig., 758 F. Supp. 226, 230 (D.N.J.1990).

There is an abuse of discretion within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 when the action of the trial judge is clearly contrary to reason and not justified by the evidence. Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., 569 F.2d 754, 760 (3d. Cir. 1977).

The question before the court is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail; rather, it is whether he can prove any set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle them to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 81 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1984).

Therefore, in deciding a motion to dismiss, a court should look to the face of the complaint and decide whether, taking all of the allegations of fact as true and construing them in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, plaintiff’s allegations state a legal claim. Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir.1990).

Only the allegations in the complaint, matters of public record, orders, and exhibits attached to the complaint, are taken into consideration. Chester County Intermediate Unit v. Pennsylvania Blue Shield, 896 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir.1990).

In particular, “[p]ro se submissions, `however inartfully pleaded,’ must be held to `less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers’ and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears `beyond doubt that the plaintiff *657 can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'” Then v. I.N.S., 58 F. Supp. 2d 422, 429 (D.N.J.1999)(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976)).

“Rule 54(c) provides, in pertinent part, that “every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in the party’s pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(c). This rule “requires that a court ascertain whether the plaintiffs are entitled to any remedy. As long as the plaintiffs have stated a claim for relief, it is the court’s obligation to grant the relief to which the prevailing party is entitled whether it has been specifically demanded or not.” Kirby v. United States Gov’t, 745 F.2d 204, 207 (3d Cir. 1984) (emphasis omitted). 

We note for Lane’s benefit, however, that Rule 54(c) merely “makes clear that a judgment should give the relief to which a party is entitled, regardless of whether it is legal or equitable or both.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54 advisory committee’s note to 1937 adoption. It “was meant to protect a plaintiff from clumsy pleading, which, through technical oversight, might deprive it of a deserved recovery.” USX Corp. v. Barnhart, 395 F. 3d 161, 165 (3d Cir. 2004).  Corey Lane v., No. 17-3677 (3d Cir. 2018)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) directs a court to grant the relief to which a prevailing party is entitled, even if the party did not demand such relief in its pleadings. Rule 54(c) thus instructs district courts to “compensate the parties or remedy the situation without regard to the constraints of the antiquated and rigid forms of action.” 10 C. Wright, A. Miller, M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2662, pp. 133-134 (2d ed. 1983). Under the Federal Rules, “a party should experience little difficulty in securing a remedy other than that demanded in his pleadings when he shows he is entitled to it.” Id., at 135; see also id., § 2664, at 163 (Rule 54(c) “has been utilized when the court awards a different type of relief from that demanded in the complaint”); cf. Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 65-66 (1978) (“a federal court should not dismiss a meritorious constitutional claim because the complaint seeks one remedy rather than another plainly appropriate one”; citing Rule 54(c)). Metro-North Commuter R. Co. v. Buckley 521 U.S. 424 (1997) 

Lower courts have affirmed that Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(c) means what it says: “[R]elief in damages is not foreclosed by plaintiff’s failure to ask for damages in prayer.” Jet Inv., Inc. v. Department of Army, 84 F. 3d 1137, 1143 (CA9 1996); Illinois Physicians Union v. Miller, 675 F. 2d 151, 158 (CA7 1982) (“It is well-settled that the district court may grant monetary relief . . . , even without a specific request”); United States v. Marin, 651 F. 2d 24, 30 (CA1 1981) (affirming award of damages although not expressly requested in complaint); Sapp v. Renfroe, 511 F. 2d 172, 176, n. 3 (CA5 1975) (allowing claim for damages raised for first time on appeal in light of Rule 54(c) and the catchall prayer for relief in plaintiff’s complaint); accord, 10 Wright & Miller §2664. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n. v. City of New York No. 18-280 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2020).

Holding that a “court cannot provide a remedy, even if one is demanded, when plaintiff has failed to set out a claim for relief” USX Corp. v. Barnhart 395 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2004).

Thus, even if Plaintiff’s complaint has no cause of action labeled “malicious prosecution” or “malicious abuse of process,” the Court is duty-bound to consider these claims if the pleaded facts could support such claims.  Evans v. Solomon 681 F. Supp. 2d 233 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)

In Evans v. City of Newark Civ. No. 14-00120 (KM) (MAH) (D.N.J. May. 10, 2016) the District Court stated: “Count 1, which does not specify any source of law, will be treated as a state law tort claim of abuse of process. Counts 4 and 5, though nonspecific, are broad enough to encompass parallel claims of abuse of process under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” In Partners of Mass., LLC v. Fantasia Civil Action No. 15-7960 (KSH) (CLl/\t? (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2019, the District Court stated: •”There is a distinction between Count 5 and the malicious use of process claim (Count 6) that Fantasia has voluntarily withdrawn. (Opp. Br. 11.)” “However, we remand with instructions to the trial court to enter a nunc pro tune order to correct clerical mistakes in the written sentence and judgment that fail to accurately denominate Defendant’s counts.” State v. Brown Court of Appeals of Missouri, Eastern District, First Division. Stating ” … once the district court made initial threshold determination that some of the claims were not frivolous and that service should issue, the court should not have subsequently used § 1915(d) to dispose of the originally non-frivolous claims” since doing so treats indigent litigants differently and effectively bypasses procedural protections the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure affords all litigants. Roman v. Jeffes 904 F.2d 192 (3d Cir. 1990) Citing Ray v. Robinson 640 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1981)

Holding that “victims” of “misconduct in federal litigation” “may, in appropriate circumstances, bring suit to recover damages under state causes of action” for “abuse of process and similar torts” U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins 281 F.3d 383 (3d Cir. 2002)

A plaintiff is not required to state what law he brings his action but is only required to plead facts which under the law that is, any law applicable to the ase entitle him to recover,’ Newberry v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. 5 Cir., 276F.337, 341. See also Adams v. States Fair. D.C. 11 F. 2d 295.

A party incorporation by reference documents into the complaint “treats certain documents as though they are part of the complaint itself.” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 1002 (9th Cir. 2018). 

The Court may incorporate a document by reference where the plaintiff has referred “extensively to the document or the document forms the basis of the plaintiff’s claim.” U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The doctrine permits the Court “to take into account documents `whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the [plaintiff’s] pleading.'” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 986 (9th Cir. 1999)) (alteration in original). (“[C]ourts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”);

In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1426 (holding a “`document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint’ may be considered `without converting the motion [to dismiss] into one for summary judgment’“) (quoting Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1220 (1st Cir.1996) (superseded on other grounds by the PSLRA, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)-(2))); TMJ Implants, Inc. v. Aetna, Inc., 498 F.3d 1175, at 1180, 2007 WL 2372372, at *3 (10th Cir.2007) 

The Rule expressly permits such evidence to be admitted to prove other facts in issue, such as “motive, intent, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident,” but admissibility is subject to the trial court’s duty to weigh the probative value of the evidence against its capacity for prejudice. State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 265 (1987) United States v. Dozier, 119 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 1997)  If there is a cause of action, no matter if obscure, dismissal of the complaint is not appropriate. Every reasonable inference is threfeore accorded the plaintiff and the motion granted only in rare instances and ordinarily without prejudice. See Banco Popular No. America v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 165-166(205). (“In fact, in would appear to the court that, given that a criminal complaint had already issued against Lynn Wehling, that these certifications and accompanying materials may be more appropriately characterized as potential evidence to support the charges that plaintiff pressed and that Judge Kasper found to be supported by probable cause.” (Pg.17)) Citing El Mujaddid v. City of Vineland, et. al., CAM-L-4550-13 July 1, 2014 Excerpts Judge Robert G. Millenky Written Opinion

In Evans v. City of Newark Civ. No. 14-00120 (KM) (MAH) (D.N.J. May. 10, 2016) the District Court stated: “Count 1, which does not specify any source of law, will be treated as a state law tort claim of abuse of process. Counts 4 and 5, though nonspecific, are broad enough to encompass parallel claims of abuse of process under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” In Partners of Mass., LLC v. Fantasia Civil Action No. 15-7960 (KSH) (CLl/\t? (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2019, the District Court stated: •”There is a distinction between Count 5 and the malicious use of process claim (Count 6) that Fantasia has voluntarily withdrawn. (Opp. Br. 11.)” “However, we remand with instructions to the trial court to enter a nunc pro tune order to correct clerical mistakes in the written sentence and judgment that fail to accurately denominate Defendant’s counts.” State v. Brown Court of Appeals of Missouri, Eastern District, First Division. Stating ” … once the district court made initial threshold determination that some of the claims were not frivolous and that service should issue, the court should not have subsequently used § 1915(d) to dispose of the originally non-frivolous claims” since doing so treats indigent litigants differently and effectively bypasses procedural protections the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure affords all litigants. Roman v. Jeffes 904 F.2d 192 (3d Cir. 1990) Citing Ray v. Robinson 640 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1981) The principles of notice pleading, and the liberal discovery rules allow for meritorious claims to proceed even if a confined prisoner cannot adduce all the necessary facts at the outset.

“On many occasions the Negro plaintiffs through one or more of their number, have complained both to representatives of the Brotherhood and to representatives of the Company about the foregoing discrimination and violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Said Negro plaintiffs have also called upon the Brotherhood to process a grievance on their behalf with the Company under the machinery provided by the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Although a representative of the Brotherhood once indicated to the Negro plaintiffs that the Brotherhood would `investigate the situation,’ nothing concrete was ever done by the Brotherhood and no grievance was ever filed. Other representatives of the Brotherhood told the Negro plaintiffs time and time again: (a) that they were kidding themselves if they thought they could ever get white men’s jobs; (b) that nothing would ever be done for them; and (c) that to file a formal complaint with the Brotherhood or with the Company would be a waste of their time. They were told the same things by local representatives of the Company. They were treated with condescension by both Brotherhood and Company, sometimes laughed at and sometimes `cussed,’ but never taken seriously. When the white plaintiffs brought their plight to the attention of the Brotherhood, they got substantially the same treatment which the Negro plaintiffs received, except that they were called `nigger lovers’ and were told that they were just inviting trouble. Both defendants attempted to intimidate plaintiffs, Negro and white. Plaintiffs have been completely frustrated in their efforts to present their grievance either to the Brotherhood or to the Company. In addition, to employ the purported internal complaint machinery within the Brotherhood itself would only add to plaintiffs’ frustration and, if ever possible to pursue it to a final conclusion it would take years. To process a grievance with the Company without the cooperation of the Brotherhood would be a useless formality. To take the grievance before the National Railroad Adjustment Board (a tribunal composed of paid representatives from the Companies and the Brotherhoods) would consume an average time of five years, and would be completely futile under the instant circumstances where the Company and the Brotherhood are working `hand-in-glove.’ All of these purported administrative remedies are wholly inadequate, and to require their complete exhaustion would simply add to plaintiffs’ expense and frustration, would exhaust plaintiffs, and would amount to a denial of `due process of law,’ prohibited by the Constitution of the United States.” Holding petitioners sufficiently alleged futility by asserting they made “repeated complaints to company and union officials” to file grievance. Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. 393 U.S. 324 (1969)

“Holding that there is no heightened pleading requirement in § 1983 suits against municipalities” Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit 507 U.S. 163 (1993)

“Holding an affidavit “must provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause” and that “wholly conclusory” statements about the officer’s beliefs are insufficient.” Illinois v. Gates 462 U.S. 213 (1983)