“Cities have been traditionally regarded as subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by the state to assist in the carrying out of state governmental functions. Reynolds v. Sims (1964), 377 U.S. 533, 575, 12 L.Ed. 2d 506, 84 S.Ct. 1362; State v. Horton (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 464, 469, 632 N.E.2d 993.
Accordingly, the city of Cleveland is deemed to be the same sovereign as the State of Ohio in the present case. Day, supra at 7. In order for collateral estoppel to apply, two conditions must be satisfied: (1) the issue must be identical and (2) the parties or their privies must be the same. Whitehead v. Gen. Tel. Co. (1969) 20 Ohio St.2d 108, 112; State v. Crago (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 621, 637. City of South Euclid v. Swirsky No. 79865 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2002)”
Therefore, based on this court’s earlier decision in Day and the ruling in Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. (1983), 2 Ohio St.3d 193, syllabus, stating that “*** a prior judgment estops a party, or a person in privity with him, from subsequently re-litigating the identical -6- issue raised in the prior action,” the decision of the common pleas court is binding upon the actions of the South Euclid Municipal Court.