Citing 8 Moore’s Federal Practice 3.05 at p. 3-7 (in effect in 1975), the district court observed that “[a]lthough a private citizen is not barred by the Rules from instituting a complaint before a magistrate; he may not do so as a matter of right.” 403 F. Supp. at 174. Further citing Professor Moore, the court pointed out the problems that would result from a contrary rule:  The broader issue which this presents is the scope of the government’s control over the prosecution of crime. It would avail a private citizen little to have his complaint accepted by the magistrate–and perhaps even have the accused arrested and bound over–only to have the matter die because of the prosecutor’s refusal to present the case to the grand jury. Theoretically, the grand jury could be induced to act, but even here the prosecutor might be able effectively to obstruct the filing of an indictment. It has been the role of the victim or concerned citizen to report knowledge of criminal activities to the proper law enforcement authorities. 183 N.J. 133, 870 A.2d 249. In the Matter of the Grand Jury Appearance Request by Larry S. Loigman, Esq. (A-51-04) Argued February 15, 2005 — Decided April 11, 2005 ALBIN, J., writing for a unanimous Court. Shim v. Kikkoman Int’l Corp., 509 F. Supp. 736, 739-40 (D.N.J.), aff’d, 673 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing McBlain, supra) See U.S. Code § 3044.Complaint—(Rule)

To comport with the Equal Protection clause, the law cannot be administered with an evil eye and uneven hand. (See Eckert v. Town of Silverthorne, 258 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2010)). McCrary v. County of Nassau 493 F. Supp. 2d 581 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)  See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973). However, in Myers v. County of Orange, 157 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 1998), the Second Circuit held that where a district attorney enacts a policy which acts as a blanket proscription against criminal cross-complaints, the cross-complainant’s constitutional rights are violated. The court stated that “a policy by a police department or district attorney’s . . . office favoring an initial complainant over a later one without giving primary regard to the particular facts involved in the case violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”

Fox v. City of New York 03 Civ. 2268 (FM) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2004)   For that reason, the Second Circuit has held that a blanket no cross-complaint policy “bears no rational relationship to the legitimate governmental interest in impartial law enforcement and thus violate[s] . . . equal protection.” Myers v. County of Orange, 157 F.3d 66, 76 (2d Cir. 1998). Benitez v. City of N.Y. 17 CV 3827 (SJ) (SJB) (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 13, 2018) But in determining whether a municipality is liable under section 1983, a court “ask[s] whether governmental officials are final policymakers for the local government in a particular area, or on a particular issue, an inquiry that will necessarily be dependent on the definition of the official’s functions under relevant state law.” Myers v. County of Orange, 157 F.3d 66, 76 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 785 (1997)) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, the relevant inquiry in determining whether a municipality is subject to section 1983 liability is not whether the DA is acting in an administrative or prosecutorial role as is required in determining whether absolute immunity attaches, but whether the DA is functioning as a local or state actor under state law.

Inocencio v. Arroyo 08-CV-4898 (RJD) (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2009) See Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 86 (1981) (per curiam) (“a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another”) (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)); Yashaahla v. M.H.A.N.Y., No. 05 CV 4963, 2006 WL 845586, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2006). However, plaintiff may have a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as enumerated in Myers v. County of Orange, 157 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 1998). “The Second Circuit held that where a district attorney enacts a policy which acts as a blanket proscription against criminal cross-complaints, the cross-complainant’s constitutional rights are violated.”

Galgano v. Cnty. of Putnam Case No. 16-CV-3572 (KMK) (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 28, 2018)   This “inquiry is dependent on an analysis of state law.” McMillian v. Monroe Cty., 520 U.S. 781, 786 (1997); see alsoMyers v. Cty. of Orange, 157 F.3d 66, 76 (2d Cir. 1998) (“We first ask whether governmental officials are final policymakers for the local government in a particular area, or on a particular issue, an inquiry that will necessarily be dependent on the definition of the official’s functions under relevant state law.” (internal quotation marks omitted))

Staley v. Grady 371 F. Supp. 2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)  However, where a governmental entity enacts a policy which acts as a blanket proscription against cross-complaints, the cross-complainant’s constitutional rights are violated. See Myers v. County of Orange, 157 F.3d 66, 76 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that a blanket no cross-complaint policy “bears no rational relationship to the legitimate governmental interest in impartial law enforcement and thus violate[s] . . . equal protection”). In Myers, the Second Circuit held that “a policy by a police department or district attorney’s . . . office favoring an initial complainant over a later one without giving primary regard to the particular facts involved in the case violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 69.

McCrary v. County of Nassau 493 F. Supp. 2d 581 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)  See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973). However, in Myers v. County of Orange, 157 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 1998), the Second Circuit held that where a district attorney enacts a policy which acts as a blanket proscription against criminal cross-complaints, the cross-complainant’s constitutional rights are violated. The court stated that “a policy by a police department or district attorney’s . . . office favoring an initial complainant over a later one without giving primary regard to the particular facts involved in the case violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”

Fox v. City of New York 03 Civ. 2268 (FM) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2004)   For that reason, the Second Circuit has held that a blanket no cross-complaint policy “bears no rational relationship to the legitimate governmental interest in impartial law enforcement and thus violate[s] . . . equal protection.” Myers v. County of Orange, 157 F.3d 66, 76 (2d Cir. 1998).

Benitez v. City of N.Y. 17 CV 3827 (SJ) (SJB) (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 13, 2018) But in determining whether a municipality is liable under section 1983, a court “ask[s] whether governmental officials are final policymakers for the local government in a particular area, or on a particular issue, an inquiry that will necessarily be dependent on the definition of the official’s functions under relevant state law.” Myers v. County of Orange, 157 F.3d 66, 76 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 785 (1997)) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, the relevant inquiry in determining whether a municipality is subject to section 1983 liability is not whether the DA is acting in an administrative or prosecutorial role as is required in determining whether absolute immunity attaches, but whether the DA is functioning as a local or state actor under state law.

Inocencio v. Arroyo 08-CV-4898 (RJD) (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2009) See Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 86 (1981) (per curiam) (“a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another”) (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)); Yashaahla v. M.H.A.N.Y., No. 05 CV 4963, 2006 WL 845586, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2006). However, plaintiff may have a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as enumerated in Myers v. County of Orange, 157 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 1998). “The Second Circuit held that where a district attorney enacts a policy which acts as a blanket proscription against criminal cross-complaints, the cross-complainant’s constitutional rights are violated.”

Galgano v. Cnty. of Putnam Case No. 16-CV-3572 (KMK) (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 28, 2018)   This “inquiry is dependent on an analysis of state law.” McMillian v. Monroe Cty., 520 U.S. 781, 786 (1997); see alsoMyers v. Cty. of Orange, 157 F.3d 66, 76 (2d Cir. 1998) (“We first ask whether governmental officials are final policymakers for the local government in a particular area, or on a particular issue, an inquiry that will necessarily be dependent on the definition of the official’s functions under relevant state law.” (internal quotation marks omitted))

Staley v. Grady 371 F. Supp. 2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)  However, where a governmental entity enacts a policy which acts as a blanket proscription against cross-complaints, the cross-complainant’s constitutional rights are violated. See Myers v. County of Orange, 157 F.3d 66, 76 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that a blanket no cross-complaint policy “bears no rational relationship to the legitimate governmental interest in impartial law enforcement and thus violate[s] . . . equal protection”). In Myers, the Second Circuit held that “a policy by a police department or district attorney’s . . . office favoring an initial complainant over a later one without giving primary regard to the particular facts involved in the case violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 69.

An information is facially sufficient when it comports with the requirements as set forth in CPL 100.40[1]: 1. An information, or a count thereof, is sufficient on its face when:(a) It substantially conforms to the requirements prescribed in section 100.15; and(b) The allegations of the factual part of the information, together with those of any supporting depositions which may accompany it, provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged in the accusatory part of the information; and(c) Non-hearsay allegations of the factual part of the information and/or of any supporting depositions establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant’s commission thereof. see People v. Dumas, 68 NY2d 729, 497 N.E.2d 686, 506 N.Y.S.2d 319 [1986]; see also People v. Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133, 511 N.E.2d 71, 517 N.Y.S.2d 927 [1987]).

“Reasonable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense exists when evidence or information which appears reliable discloses facts or circumstances which are collectively of such weight and persuasiveness as to convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment and experience that is reasonably likely that such offense was committed and that such person committed the offense [ ]” (CPL 70.10 [2]). The measure of “reasonable cause” is the same as that of the well-established constitutional standard of [*3]”probable cause”. (People v Johnson, 66 NY2d 398, 402, n. 2, 488 [1985]). The factual allegations contained within the accusatory instrument must be strong enough to support a reasonable belief by an ordinary person that it is more likely or probable than not that the accused defendant did indeed commit the criminal offense being accused of (People v Mercado, 68 NY2d 874, 877 [1986]; People v Carrasquillo, 54 NY2d 248, 254 [1981] [“conduct equally compatible with guilt or innocence will not suffice”]).

Mere conclusory allegations will render the instrument defective (People v. Dumas, 68 NY2d 729 [1986]). The court’s standard of review for facial sufficiency must accept as true all the factual allegations contained within the information and must consider all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them (People v. Jackson, 18 NY3d 738, 741 [2012]; see CPL 100.40 [1] [c]). Further, “[s]o long as the factual allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive and technical reading” (People v. Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000])

That no court whatsoever hath power to judge or censure any Petition presented . . . .” 4 Parl. Hist. Eng. 432-433 (1669).

There can be no doubt that the petitioning of government was understood to be an inherent Right. That the Framers meant to imply a corresponding governmental duty of a fair hearing seems clear given the history of petitioning in the colonies and the colonists’ outrage at England’s refusal to listen to their grievances. “In every stage of these Oppressions we have petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury.” The Declaration of Independence para. 30 (U.S. 1776); see also 1 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS 67-92 (1775) (petition to King); id. at 117-18 (resolution protesting Parliament’s interference with right of petition); 2 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS 158-62 (1777) (petition to King). Before a First Amendment right may be curtailed under the guise of a law, such as “willful failure to file” or promotion of an illegal tax shelter,” any evil that may be collateral to the exercise of the right, must be isolated and defined in a “narrowly drawn” statute (Cantwell v. 43 Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307) lest the power to control excesses of conduct be used to suppress the constitutional right itself. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258-259; Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 238; N. A. A. C. P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433.

It was the duty of a judge to issue a warrant on the complaint of any citizen. U.S. v. Skinner, C.C.N.Y. 1818, 27 F.Cas. 1123, No. 1630.

The clerk-magistrate performs many roles that are crucial to the fair and efficient administration of justice in a District Court. First, a clerk-magistrate has substantial adjudicative responsibilities. In criminal matters, a clerk-magistrate reviews applications for search warrants and arrest warrants for probable cause. See G.L. c. 218, § 33.’ The United States, At Relation of Aaron Goodrich, Plaintiff In Error v. James Guthrie, Secretary of the Treasury, 58 U.S. 284, 299 (U.S. 1854).

We note preliminarily that an individual’s constitutional right of access to the courts is well settled. SeeChambers v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 207 U.S. 142, 28 S.Ct. 34, 52 L. Ed. 143 (1907).

To deprive a whole class of the community of this right, to refuse their evidence and their sworn complaints, is to brand them with a badge of slavery; is to expose them to wanton insults and fiendish assaults; is to leave their lives, their families, and their property unprotected by law. It gives unrestricted license and impunity to vindictive outlaws and felons to rush upon these helpless people and kill and slay them at will, as was done in this case. Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581, 598-99 (1871) (Bradley, J., dissenting). “Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, it is well-settled that the term ‘involuntary servitude’ is not limited to chattel slavery-like conditions,” appellate judge Barrington Parker wrote in the court’s opinion. “The amendment was intended to prohibit all forms of involuntary labor, not solely to abolish chattel slavery. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908));

Equality under the Privileges and Immunities Clauses under Article IV, Section 2, of the United States Constitution, non-citizens of a state are assured that in their “fundamental” privileges and immunities they will be accorded equality with citizens of the state. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. No.1312 at 551 (E.D.Pa.1823). Mitchell v. United States, supra note 77; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat.1 (U.S.1824); Houston, East & W. Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S.342 (1914); Railroad Commission v. Chicago, B.& Q. Rr., 25 7 U.S. 563 (1922). Comment, 40 Mica. L. Rv. 711, 728 (1942). Note, 42 COL.L. Rev. 139, 140 (1942).

In this case, Hurd v. Hodge, the Court stated that it would violate this policy” to permit federal courts in the Nation’s capital to exercise general equity powers to compel action denied the states where such action has been held to be violative of the guarantee of equal protection of the laws. 334U.S.24, 35(1948).

As the Supreme Court stated in Brinegar v. United States, 338U.S.160, 175, 69S. Ct.1302, 1310, 93L. Ed.1879, 1890(1949): “In dealing with probable cause, * * * as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” By its very nature probable cause is a standard which can be applied by laymen, so long as they exercise reasonable caution. It is a practical, on-technical concept, not requiring the complex weighing of factual and legal considerations which is the judge’s daily task. Although it eludes precise definition, probable cause “is not a technical concept but rather one having to do with `the factual and practical considerations of everyday life’ upon which reasonable men, not constitutional lawyers, act.” Waltz, 61 N.J. at 87, 293 A.2d 167(quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L.Ed. 1879, 1890 (1949)). 

“It is not the function of our Government to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the government from falling into error.” (American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 442 (1950).

Equal Protection under the Thirteenth Amendment In the Civil Rights cases Mr. Justice Harlan argued, quite correctly it is suggested, that as to Negroes the Thirteenth Amendment invalidates” all discriminations against them, because of their race, in respect of such civil rights as belong to freemen of other races.” Civil Rights Cases, supra note 64. However, when the racial discrimination or other imposed inequality amounts to peon-age, the Thirteenth Amendment perforce strikes down the in equality. The Due Process Clause of the 5th Amendment applies only to the Federal Government. The Fifth Amendment does not include an equal protection guarantee. However, in Bolling v. Sharpe 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Supreme Court held the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause to include an equal protection element identical in effect to that of the fourteenth amendment. And, the following year, 1948, the Court, although not specifically referring to the Fifth Amendment, indicated very positively that equal protection is “a part of the public policy of the United States.”

In Adderley v. Florida, Supreme Court Justice Douglas wrote: The historical antecedents of the right to petition for the redress of grievances run deep, and strike to the heart of the democratic philosophy. C. 61 of the Magna Carta provided: “That if we or our justiciar, or our bailiffs, or any of our servants shall have done wrong in any way toward any one, or shall have transgressed any of the articles of peace or security; and the wrong shall have been shown to four barons of the aforesaid twenty-five barons, let those four barons come to us or to our justiciar, if we are out of the kingdom, laying before us the transgression, and let them ask that we cause that transgression to be corrected without delay.” Sources of Our Liberties 21 (Perry ed. 1959).

Cooper v. Aaron, the Court said: “The Constitution created a government dedicated to equal justice under law. Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall made a similar point: “The principles which would have governed with $10,000 at stake should also govern when thousands have become billions. That is the essence of equal justice under law.” Pennzoil v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1 (1987)(Thurgood Marshall, concurring in the judgment).

In California Motor Transport, the Court added that “the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government [and] [t]he right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.” Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 56, 123 L. Ed. 2d 611, 113 S. Ct. 1920 (1993)(same). With this underpinning, the Court stated, “[Because] the right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, . . . we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms.” Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136.

Although there does not appear to be case law on point in the Ninth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held, in the context [*17] of a First Amendment retaliation claim, “that ‘filing a criminal complaint with law enforcement officials constitutes an exercise of the First Amendment right’ to petition the government for the redress of grievances.” Monte L. Low, Plaintiff, V. City Of Sacramento, Defendant. No. 2:10-Cv-01624 Jam Kjn Ps United States District Court For The Eastern District Of California 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 98328 September 16, 2010, Decided September 17, 2010, Filed.

The right to petition for the redress of grievances has an ancient history and is not limited to writing a letter or sending a telegram to a congressman; it is not confined to appearing before the local city council, or writing letters to the President or Governor or Mayor. See N. A. A. C. P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-431(1963).

The court cited McGill v. Board of Educ., 602 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1979) (a retaliatory transfer gives rise to a first amendment claim), Simpson v. Weeks, 570 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 911 (1979) (retaliatory transfer is actionable); Rosada v. Santiago, 562 F.2d 114 (1st Cir. 1977) (a transfer constitutes a first amendment violation, although the court proceeded to hold that damages in the form of past wages would be justified only if the transfer constituted an effective discharge).

See Kreimer v. Bu. of Police for Town of Morris 958 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1992)(Explaining that “courts have transplanted this due process principle into the First Amendment setting”).

We conclude that the Mirabellas have pled a retaliation claim based upon Walsh’s “no contact” email. Maureen Mirabella John Mirabella V. Susan Villard William Villard Susan Braun Robert Braun Montgomery Township Board Of Supervisors Supervisor Joseph Walsh Supervisor Michael Fox Supervisor Robert Birch Supervisor Candyce Fluehr Chimera Montgomery Township Supervisor Jeffrey Mcdonnell United States Court Of Appeals For The Third Circuit No. 15-3171.

In a retaliation claim, we ask instead “whether the Government is punishing the plaintiffs for exercising their rights.” Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 148 n.9 (3d Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original) (quoting Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 161 (3d Cir. 1997)).See Milhouse v. Carlson 652 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1981)(Locating right to access the courts in a retaliation case in the First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances.)

The Supreme Court has likened a retaliatory prosecution claim to the common law analogs of malicious prosecution and abuse of process, Hartman 547 U.S. at 258. See Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 374 (3d Cir. 1981).

In Milhouse, the inmate alleged that prison officials retaliated against him by fabricating misconduct charges in response to his civil rights suit against the prison officials. We concluded that “[s]uch allegations if proven at trial, would establish an infringement of Milhouse’s first amendment right of access to the courts.” Milhouse, 652 F.2d at 374. PAGE 653 See Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir.1994) See Mozzochi v. Borden, 959 F.2d 1174, 1179 (2d Cir.1992) (“it has long been established that certain adverse governmental action taken in retaliation against the exercise of free speech violates the First Amendment.”); Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F.3d at 79 (holding that abuse of process, motivated by “retaliation,” is actionable under § 1983).

We have previously held that falsifying misconduct reports in retaliation for an inmate’s resort to legal process is a violation of the First Amendment guarantee of access to the courts. United States Court of Appeals,Third Circuit. Carl M. SMITH, Appellant, v. Robin MENSINGER;  David Novitsky;  Jerome Paulukonis;  Mary Canino;  Paul Burgard;  Martin Dragovich, Jeffrey Yurkiewicz, Paul Androshick, Bernard McCole, James Zubris, and Raymond Jones. No. 99-1382. Decided: June 11, 2002

The Supreme Court Reporter, Volume 27 states: As we have seen, this court has held that the 13th Amendment, by its own force, without aid of legislation,…conferred freedom upon every person…,..the right and privilege of being free from the badges or incidents of slavery…….I have already said that the liberty protected by the 14th Amendment against state action inconsistent with due process of law is neither more nor less than the freedom established by the 13th Amendment. This I think, cannot be doubted. In Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589, 41 L. ed.832, 835, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427, 431, we [Supreme Court] said that such liberty..is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them all lawful ways; to live and work when he will; to earn his livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned. All these rights, as this court adjudged in the Allgeyer Case are embraced in the liberty which the 14th Amendment protects against hostile state action when such state action is wanting in due process of law. They are rights essential in the freedom conferred by the 13th Amendment. Page 1627 Supreme Court Reporter Oct. Term.

18 U.S. Code § 3332.Powers and duties

(a)It shall be the duty of each such grand jury impaneled within any judicial district to inquire into offenses against the criminal laws of the United States alleged to have been committed within that district. Such alleged offenses may be brought to the attention of the grand jury by the court or by any attorney appearing on behalf of the United States for the presentation of evidence. Any such attorney receiving information concerning such an alleged offense from any other person shall, if requested by such other person, inform the grand jury of such alleged offense, the identity of such other person, and such attorney’s action or recommendation.

(b)Whenever the district court determines that the volume of business of the special grand jury exceeds the capacity of the grand jury to discharge its obligations, the district court may order an additional special grand jury for that district to be impaneled.

U.S. Code § 3041.Power of courts and magistrates 

For any offense against the United States, the offender may, by any justice or judge of the United States, or by any United States magistrate judge, or by any chancellor, judge of a supreme or superior court, chief or first judge of the common pleas, mayor of a city, justice of the peace, or other magistrate, of any state where the offender may be found, and at the expense of the United States, be arrested and imprisoned or released as provided in chapter 207 of this title, as the case may be, for trial before such court of the United States as by law has cognizance of the offense. Copies of the process shall be returned as speedily as may be into the office of the clerk of such court, together with the recognizances of the witnesses for their appearances to testify in the case.

A United States judge or magistrate judge shall proceed under this section according to rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States. Any state judge or magistrate acting hereunder may proceed according to the usual mode of procedure of his state but his acts and orders shall have no effect beyond determining, pursuant to the provisions of section 3142 of this title, whether to detain or conditionally release the prisoner prior to trial or to discharge him from arrest. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 815; Pub. L. 89–465, § 5(a), June 22, 1966, 80 Stat. 217; Pub. L. 90–578, title III, § 301(a)(1), (3), Oct. 17, 1968, 82 Stat. 1115; Pub. L. 98–473, title II, § 204(a), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 1985; Pub. L. 101–650, title III, § 321, Dec. 1, 1990, 104 Stat. 5117.)

U.S. Code § 242.Deprivation of rights under color of law

Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 696; Pub. L. 90–284, title I, § 103(b), Apr. 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 75; Pub. L. 100–690, title VII, § 7019, Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4396; Pub. L. 103–322, title VI, § 60006(b), title XXXII, §§ 320103(b), 320201(b), title XXXIII, § 330016(1)(H), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 1970, 2109, 2113, 2147; Pub. L. 104–294, title VI, §§ 604(b)(14)(B), 607(a), Oct. 11, 1996, 110 Stat. 3507, 3511.)