Passaic County Legal Aid Society is a prepaid legal services corporation funded in part under the National Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996a-k.
Its special mission is to provide legal representation to needy people and to make real the ideal of equal justice under law.
Ordinarily such organizations do not handle fee generating cases: the theory is that the private bar will have a sufficient incentive to take on such litigation. Some consumer claims, however, are either emergent in nature or of doubtful value. For them, a public-interest law firm may be the only resort.
The public-interest counsel argue that in such cases it is appropriate that statutory fees be allowed, not just to vindicate the representation in the particular case but to restore the resources necessarily diverted from a non-fee-generating matter. We were advised at oral argument by public interest counsel that the Consumer Fraud Act is no longer legislation for the poor. It has become, they say, a tool of the privileged. See Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht Sales, Inc., 110 N.J. 464 (1988) (claim that racing boat’s engine was defective). Without the bite of counsel fees, the Act, they argue, will become a “dead letter.”
the system has resulted in the denial of substantial and equal justice to seriously injured accident victims who are unable to withstand the financial burdens consequent upon long court delays and who are, therefore, forced into inadequate settlements of their claims. [ Public Hearings, supra, Vol. 1 at 54.] Gambino v. Royal Globe Ins. Co. 429 A.2d 1039 (N.J. 1981) Cited 49 times
As quoted above, Pericles said that a person’s wealth or prominence should not influence his eligibility for public employment or affect the justice he receives. Similarly, Chief Justice Hughes defended the inscription “equal justice under law” by referring to the judicial oath of office, which requires judges to “administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich”. Decades later, Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall made a similar point: “The principles which would have governed with $10,000 at stake should also govern when thousands have become billions. That is the essence of equal justice under law.” Pennzoil v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1 (1987)(Thurgood Marshall, concurring in the judgment).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015), together ensure equal justice under the law for all persons, rich and poor. in the court system. “Due process and equal protection principles converge, ”Bearden, 466 U.S. at 665, to ensure that the state may not “bolt the door to equal justice.” Griffin, 351 U.S. at 24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 120 color.” Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17. As that Court has explained, “[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.” Id. at 19. Poverty.” The “comfortable convenience of the status quo,” Williams, 399 U.S. at 245, must give way to our Constitution’s commitment to equal justice for rich and poor alike.
A federal officer remains liable for acts committed ‘manifestly or palpably beyond his authority.’ Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498, 16 S.Ct. 631, 637, 40 L.Ed. 780; see Colpoys v. Gates, 73 App.D.C. 193, 118 F.2d 16; Kozlowski v. Ferrara, D.C., 117 F.Supp. 650; Note, Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 Harv.L.Rev. 827, 835 (1957). Liberally construed, see Virgin Islands Corp. v. W. A. Taylor & Co., 2 Cir., 202 F.2d 61; 2 Moore, Federal practice (2d ed. 1948), 12.08, at 2245, petitioner Dawson’s complaint alleges no less.
Mutuality of remedy is important in so far only as its presence is essential to the attainment of that end. The formula had its origin in an attempt to fit the equitable remedy to the needs of equal justice. We may not suffer it to petrify at the cost of its animating principle.” Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N.Y. 490, 135 N.E. 861 (1922). Fleischer v. James Drug Stores 62 A.2d 383 (N.J. 1948)
Our Constitutions, federal and state, are documents designed to have some permanency. This is most notably so with the former, which has been amended only 26 times in nearly 200 years. However, the value of these societal blue-prints is in their adaptability. The democratic experiment which is this country could hardly have survived, let alone prospered, if the early constitutional pronouncements of our Supreme Court were deemed immutable. Our constitutional charters are vital, dynamic documents whose interpretation should reflect our society’s significant, although at times halting, progress toward the elusive goal of equal justice. Potter v. Finch Sons
Equal justice is of the very essence of the power. Impartial administration is the controlling principle. The rule of action must apply equally to all persons similarly circumstanced. There is a denial of the equal protection of the laws unless the water service be available to all in like circumstances upon the same terms and conditions, although the rule of equality may have a pragmatic application. Persons situated alike shall be treated alike. Washington National Insurance Co. v. Board of Review, 1 N.J. 545 (1949); Librizzi v. Plunkett, 126 N.J.L. 17 ( Sup. Ct. 1940); Millville Improvement Co. v. Millville Water Co., 92 N.J. Eq. 480 ( Ch. 1921); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886); People v. Kuc, 272 N.Y. 72, 4 N.E.2d 939 ( Ct. App. 1936). PAGE 233, Reid Development Corp. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills 89 A.2d 667 (N.J. 1952)
In such situations the exercise of discretion may and properly should take these factors into account by the simple device of making the dismissal subject to appropriate terms and conditions and thus accomplishing equal justice between the parties. Cf. Gore v. United States Steel Corp., supra, 15 N.J. at page 313; Rodriguez v. A.H. Bull Steamship Co., 286 App. Div. 804, 143 N.Y.S.2d 618 ( App. Div. 1955); “Place of Trial — Interstate Application of Intrastate Methods of Adjustment,” 44 Harv. L. Rev. 41, 49-53 (1930).Vargas v. A.H. Bull Steamship Co. 135 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1957)
Stating that Article I of the New Jersey Constitution, although it does not contain the phrases “due process” and “equal protection,” “safeguards values like those encompassed by the principles of due process and equal protection.” Id. at 568, 494 A.2d 294.The wisdom of that method is apparent upon considering the changing roles of due process and equalprotection in federal analysis. Not only has the United States Supreme Court alternated between the due process and equal protection clauses over the past fifty years, but in some cases it has become entangled in their separate strands.For example, in Zablocki, Justice Marshall, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, White and Blackmun, held to be violative of the equal protection clause a Wisconsin statute forbidding a Wisconsin resident in default of a support order from marrying without first obtaining court approval. Although he did not agree with the majority’s equal protection formulation, Justice Stevens agreed that equal protection provided the appropriate method of analysis. 434 U.S. at 403, 98 S.Ct. at 690, 54 L.Ed.2d at 641.
Justice Stewart found the statute invalid as a matter of due process, and wrote in a concurring opinion that the majority’s equal protection test “is no more than substantive due process by another name.” 434 U.S. at 395, 98 S.Ct. at 686, 54 L.Ed.2d at 636. Justice Powell found that “[t]he Wisconsin measure in this case does not pass muster under either due process or equal protection standards.” 434 U.S. at 400, 98 S.Ct. at 688, 54 L.Ed.2d at 640.
By contrast, Justice Rehnquist found that the statute satisfied the requirements of both the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 434 U.S. at 407-11, 98 S.Ct. at 692-94, 54 L.Ed.2d at 644-47. See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur, supra, 414 U.S. 632, 94 S.Ct. 791, 39 L.Ed.2d 52 (majority comprised of Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, invalidated school board rules as a violation of due process; Justice Douglas concurred in the result; on equal protection grounds, Justice Powell concurred, and Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, dissented); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 259, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 2031, 26 L.Ed.2d 586, 603 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (relies on due process analysis and characterizes majority’s reliance on equal protection clause as a “wolf in sheep’s clothing”). As the preceding discussion illustrates, due process and equal protection analyses, while proceeding along parallel lines, may overlap, or at least so it may seem. Right to Choose v. Byrne, supra, 91 N.J. at 310 n. 8. Greenberg v. Kimmelman 494 A.2d 294 (N.J. 1985)
Last year marked the fiftieth anniversary of the landmark ruling in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), a case trumpeting the right to counsel for the indigent in criminal cases. After Gideon, this Court took a giant step forward—far ahead of other courts in the nation—to secure for the poor the opportunity for equal justice in courtrooms throughout this State. See Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281, 277 A.2d 216 (1971).
The right to counsel is an essential attribute of a fair trial. The denial of this petition will surely disappoint those who expect this Court to remain at the forefront of ensuring a fair adversarial process for the poor who face serious consequences of magnitude in civil cases. D.N. v. K.M. 83 A.3d 825 (N.J. 2014)
Board of Chosen Freeholders v. State 732 A.2d 1053 (N.J. 1999) Interpreting phrase judicial costs, “including but not limited to the following costs: salaries, health benefits and pension payments of all judicial employees, juror fees and library material costs” to not include the capital costs of judicial facilities The constitutional amendment will finally, for the first time in our history, start to bring equal justice to all of our citizens. Those counties today that devote more money to justice than others, either because they are richer or more willing, or both, usually get what their money pays for, . . . justice with all of the court-related programs that are so necessary today, the availability of complementary dispute resolution, the services of highly-trained professional staff, all as compared to the justice received by those in the less fortunate counties, threadbare justice with long waiting lines, lacking many of the attributes found in other counties.The Rules are written to require uniformity as a means of providing equal justice. The time has come to enforce the Rules and not to decide an appeal merely because the respondent did not move to dismiss it and it was fully briefed. Vitanza v. James 938 A.2d 166 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2008)There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts. In re Guardianship of Dotson 367 A.2d 1160 (N.J. 1976)As it stands now, “[t]he common sense teaching of Parratt is that some questions of property, contract, and tort law are best resolved by state legal systems without resort to the federal courts, even when a state actor is the alleged wrongdoer.” Albright, supra, 510 U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 818, 127 L.Ed.2d at 130 (Kennedy, J., concurring).So long as state legal systems remain committed to principles of equal justice and provide plain and adequate remedies to prevent unconstitutional deprivations of property, there is no occasion for plaintiffs to seek redress in federal court or under federal law. Unless a substantial federal question is shown, land use decisions should “properly rest with the community that is ultimately — and intimately — affected.” Gardner v. Baltimore Mayor City Council, 969 F.2d 63, 68 (4th Cir. 1992).Equal justice is of the very essence of the power. Impartial administration is the controlling principle. The rule of action must apply equally to all persons similarly circumstanced. There is a denial of the equal protection of the laws unless the water service be available to all in like circumstances upon the same terms and conditions, although the rule of equality may have a pragmatic application.” ( 10 N.J., at page 233)
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