While disease or illness may warrant equitable tolling, the disease must be of such severity that it rendered the litigant unable to pursue his legal claims. See Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 715 (1999) (referring to mental illness); Smith v. Johnson, 247 F.3d 240, 2001 WL 43520, at *3 (5th Cir. Jan.3, 2001) (per curiam) (unpublished) (Also referring to mental illness in the context of a habeas corpus claim and holding, “[A] prisoner’s claim of mental incompetence may support tolling the AEDPA time limit if the mental impairment precluded the prisoner from effectively asserting his legal rights”) Additionally, to the extent Petitioner argues that his mental health issues warrant equitable tolling, he fails to support that argument with “concrete evidence” that such challenges might excuse his several years’ delay. Brennan v. United States, 1994 WL 327621, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 1994) (denying equitable tolling where plaintiff alleged mental incompetence but “offered no affidavits from members of his family or from his physician stating that he was mentally incompetent [during the relevant time period]”); see also Jones v. Jacobs, 2011 WL 5320983, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2011) (denying equitable tolling where civil rights plaintiff submitted records of his participation in the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s mental health program but still “failed to show that his mental health problems support[ed] the tolling of the limitations period for six years”); Lee v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 2011 WL 1691940, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2011) (denying equitable tolling where civil rights plaintiff’s mental health records indicated that he had been diagnosed with a depressive disorder and had been prescribed psychotropic medications but did “not provide any basis for tolling the statute of limitations”), adopted by 2011 WL 1671937 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2011).
Emanating largely from the equitable writ of audita querela, see Nichols v. Dissler, 31 N.J.L. 461, 463 (E. A. 1863), Rule 4:50 is instinct with equitable considerations. Considering these equitable roots and the well-established mandate that we liberally view and indulge such motions, we find no cause to accept what seems implicit in the judge’s holding — that a defendant is entitled to one application and one application only in seeking relief pursuant to Rule 4:50. The interests at stake, as well as our court rules’ overarching goal of promoting the fair and efficient administration of justice, Ragusa v. Lau, 119 N.J. 276, 283-84, 575 A.2d 8 (1990), are not offended by a second timely motion for relief from a default judgment in these circumstances. This is particularly true where it seems readily apparent, as here, that defendant’s first inadequate motion was doubtless hurried because plaintiff was actively pursuing execution on the default judgment. Reiterating the assertion we made in the context of attorney’s fee awards under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, “[a] court’s judgment may be guided by a number of elements, including the public interest in encouraging particular suits, the conduct of the parties and economic considerations.” United States Steel Corp., 519 F.2d at 363. Doering v. Un. Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders 857 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1988)
Holding that “wrongdoing” or “intentionally misleading” conduct are prerequisites to the application of the equitable tolling doctrine. Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran Berman 38 F.3d 1380 (3d Cir. 1994)
Holding that, generally, an attorney’s delinquency is chargeable to the client, although equitable tolling may be applied after consideration of the extent of any attorney misconduct, the diligence of the client, and prejudice to the defendant Seitzinger v. Reading Hospital & Medical Center 165 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 1999) Requiring the court to weigh equitable considerations in the light of the nature of the governmental action required. Skulski v. Nolan 343 A.2d 721 (N.J. 1975) We turn now to the doctrine of equitable tolling. Unlike the discovery rule, equitable tolling presumes the accrual of the cause of action. Equitable tolling stops the running of the statute of limitations in light of established equitable considerations. Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1390.
In Oshiver, we explained that equitable tolling may be appropriate “(1) where the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff’s cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights; or (3) where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights mistakenly in the wrong forum.” Id. at 1387. New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp. 111 F.3d 1116 (3d Cir. 1997) In Waddell v. Small Tube Prods., Inc., 799 F.2d 69, 79 (3d Cir. 1986), this court permitted equitable consideration of a plaintiff’s delay in bringing a Title VII suit. In this case, however, the trial judge did not find SEPTA was prejudiced by Robinson’s conduct in prosecuting his case. Instead it relied on his on-the-job conduct. Robinson v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., Red Arrow 982 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1993)
One of the equitable considerations expressed by the Feldman court in withholding back pay was the “extraordinary delay” in prosecuting the appeal. Id. at 184. Here, no consideration was given by the Commission to the cause of the delay and whether it was attributable to petitioner herself or the administrative process. Millan v. Morris View 177 N.J. Super. 620 (N.J. Super. 1981)
The nature of the exceptional relief afforded by Rule 4:50-1(f) requires courts to focus on equitable considerations in determining whether the specific circumstances warrant the unique remedy authorized by the Rule. Application of that subsection of the Rule to summary-dispossess proceedings is appropriate only in exceptional circumstances, and requires a trial court to weigh carefully all relevant evidence in determining whether the specific grounds advanced to support relief under the Rule are sufficient to override the strong countervailing interest favoring finality of judgments. We anticipate that the availability of relief under the Rule in summary-dispossess proceedings will be circumscribed, and that the reservoir of discretion afforded by the Rule will be exercised only in those circumstances in which the court’s intervention is required to avoid an unjust result. Housing Authority of Town of Morristown v. Little 639 A.2d 286 (N.J. 1994)