As to what would constitute fundamental injustice, it may be useful to consider a case such as State v. Cerbo, 78 N.J. 595 , 397 A.2d 671 (1979).
In that case the Court dealt with a violation of statutory policy rather than, as here, administrative policy, but the principles are the same. The Court ruled that absent constitutional infringement or the timely raising of an issue available on direct appeal, “relief will be granted in such proceedings only in exceptional circumstances involving a showing of fundamental injustice.” Id. at 605, 397 A.2d 671. Citing State v. Laurick 575 A.2d 1340 (N.J. 1990)
[i]n defining fundamental injustice, the courts will look to whether the judicial system has provided the defendant with fair proceedings leading to a just outcome. “Fundamental injustice” will be found if the prosecution or the judiciary abused the process under which the defendant was convicted or, absent conscious abuse, if inadvertent errors mistakenly impacted a determination of guilt or otherwise “wrought a miscarriage of justice for the individual defendant.” The standard goes beyond constitutional infringements to any circumstances deemed “unjust.” Although a petitioner would not have to prove that the issue of concern cost him the case, “to establish injustice there should at least be some showing that * * * [the alleged violation] played a role in the determination of guilt. * * * To conclude otherwise would exalt form over substance.” Citing State v. Martini 901 A.2d 941 (N.J. 2006), State v. Bryant DOCKET NO. A-5427-11T3 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Jan. 13, 2014)
To succeed on a claim of fundamental injustice, the petitioner must show that “an error or violation played a role in the determination of guilt.” Nash, supra, 212 N.J. at 547 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Moreover, Rule 3:22–5’s bar to review of a prior claim litigated on the merits “is not an inflexible command.” State v. Franklin, 184 N.J. 516, 528, 878 A.2d 757 (2005).
For example, this rule does not prohibit a claim for relief based on newly discovered evidence. See R. 3:20–2; cf. Ways, supra, 180 N.J. at 187, 850 A.2d 440 (citing Carter, supra, 85 N.J. at 314, 426 A.2d 501).
Under either rule, our courts are not powerless to correct a fundamental injustice. This Court will not yield to an injustice merely because no court has yet to address in any meaningful way the issue of newly discovered evidence. Citing State v. Nash 58 A.3d 705 (N.J. 2013) Describing fundamental injustice exception to procedural bars of post-conviction relief claims
“Rules of practice and procedure are devised to promote the ends of justice, not to defeat them. A rigid and undeviating judicially declared practice under which courts of review would invariably and under all circumstances decline to consider all questions which had not previously been specifically urged would be out of harmony with this policy. Orderly rules of procedure do not require sacrifice of the rules of fundamental justice. Remanding to the district court for further factual findings where factual findings were conclusory and the reviewing court could not determine what evidence the lower court accepted as credible and what it rejected O’Neill v. United States 411 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1969)
As to what would constitute fundamental injustice, it may be useful to consider a case such as State v. Cerbo, 78 N.J. 595 , 397 A.2d 671 (1979).
In that case the Court dealt with a violation of statutory policy rather than, as here, administrative policy, but the principles are the same. The Court ruled that absent constitutional infringement or the timely raising of an issue available on direct appeal, “relief will be granted in such proceedings only in exceptional circumstances involving a showing of fundamental injustice.” Id. at 605, 397 A.2d 671. Citing State v. Laurick 575 A.2d 1340 (N.J. 1990)
[i]n defining fundamental injustice, the courts will look to whether the judicial system has provided the defendant with fair proceedings leading to a just outcome. “Fundamental injustice” will be found if the prosecution or the judiciary abused the process under which the defendant was convicted or, absent conscious abuse, if inadvertent errors mistakenly impacted a determination of guilt or otherwise “wrought a miscarriage of justice for the individual defendant.” The standard goes beyond constitutional infringements to any circumstances deemed “unjust.” Although a petitioner would not have to prove that the issue of concern cost him the case, “to establish injustice there should at least be some showing that * * * [the alleged violation] played a role in the determination of guilt. * * * To conclude otherwise would exalt form over substance.” Citing State v. Martini 901 A.2d 941 (N.J. 2006), State v. Bryant DOCKET NO. A-5427-11T3 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Jan. 13, 2014)
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