In Montrose Med. Group Participating Sav. Plan v. Bulger, 243 F.3d 773, 777 (3d Cir. 2001), the Third Circuit defined the requirements for arguing judicial estoppel: “Judicial estoppel may be imposed only if:
(1) the party to be estopped is asserting a position that is irreconcilably inconsistent with one he or she asserted in a prior proceeding;
(2) the party changed his or her position in bad faith, i.e., in a culpable manner threatening to the court’s authority or integrity; and
(3) the use of judicial estoppel is tailored to address the affront to the court’s authority or integrity.” Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber 81 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 1996)
Our conclusion that privity is not required for the application of judicial estoppel accords with the majority view. See Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 214 (1st Cir. 1987)
(“harm to an opponent is not an invariable prerequisite to judicial estoppel”); Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1982)
(“judicial estoppel may be applied even if detrimental reliance or privity does not exist”); Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (same); Total Petroleum, Inc. v. Davis, 822 F.2d 734, 737 n.6 (8th Cir. 1987)
(judicial estoppel does not require reliance or prejudice, because it seeks to protect the courts); Muellner v. Mars, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 351, 356 (N.D.Ill. 1989).