The NJLAD makes it unlawful “[f]or an employer, because of race . . . to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a).

When analyzing claims of discrimination under the NJLAD based on circumstantial evidence, the Court must utilize the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine burden shifting framework at the summary judgment stage. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); Davis v. City of Newark, 285 F. App’x 899, 903 (3d Cir. 2008) (applying the McDonnell Douglas-Burdineburden shifting framework to NJLAD claims).

The McDonnell Douglass-Burdineburden shifting framework is comprised of three steps. First, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Davis, 285 F. App’x at 903 (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993)).

Although the defendant may have the chance to dispute the plaintiff’s claims of discrimination at step two, a court may only consider the plaintiff’s evidence when determining whether a prima facie case exists at step one. Rogers v. Alternative Resources Corp., 440 F. Supp. 2d 366, 370 (D.N.J. 2006).

Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the court moves to step two, where the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Davis, 285 F. App’x at 903 (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 506-07). At step three, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s reasons for its actions were not the true reason, but merely a pretext for discrimination. Id. The ultimate burden of persuading the court that the defendant discriminated remains with the plaintiff at all times. Id. (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).

In order to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination under the NJLAD, Plaintiff must prove that:

(1) he belongs to a protected class;

(2) he was qualified for his position;

(3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and

(4) the adverse action occurred under  circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination.

See Davis, 285 F. App’x at 903 (citing Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403, 410-12 (3d Cir. 1999).

Source: https://casetext.com/case/campbell-v-supreme-court-of-nj

“Observing that “[t]he power to reach private conspiracies under § 1985 emanates from” the Thirteenth Amendment. The power to reach private conspiracies under § 1985(3) emanates from this amendment. Section 1985, however, does not itself provide substantive rights. The rights sought to be vindicated must be found elsewhere. According to Dr. Wong, the rights he sought to vindicate are contained within the thirteenth amendment. He admits that the thirteenth amendment does not guarantee any particular right except the right to be free from slavery. Dr. Wong maintains, however, that this guarantee, which encompasses protection from the badges and incidents of slavery, extends to any abuse predicated upon race. The proscription in the thirteenth amendment is a broad one, but no court has held that its words alone create a general right to be free from private racial discrimination in all areas of life.”

Source: Wong v. Stripling 881 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1989)

Holding that “[w]hen plaintiffs allege classwide racially discriminatory treatment in violation of Title VII, proof of discriminatory motive is essential, although the burden may be met in some situations by presentation of statistical evidence that permits an inference of racial discrimination”

Section 1981 grants to all persons within the United States “the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .” The language of the statute is inconclusive, but we believe that if it points in any direction, it suggests a requirement for proof of purposeful discrimination. See City of Memphis v. Greene, 101 S.Ct. at 1602 (White, J., concurring) (under similar language of section 1982, “[p]urposeful racial discrimination is quite clearly the focus of the proscription”); Guardians Association, 633 F.2d at 267. See generally Heiser, Intent v. Impact, The Standard of Proof Necessary to Establish a Prima Facie Case of Race Discrimination Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 16 San Diego L.Rev. 207, 233-37 (1979) (discussing language of section 1981 and other civil rights statutes and concluding that, while not unambiguous, section 1981’s language supports argument that intent required). The guarantee of the “same right” to make contracts “as is enjoyed by white citizens” is similar to the guarantee of “equal protection” embodied in the fourteenth amendment, a standard that requires proof of intentional discrimination under Washington v. Davis. As long as both nonwhite and white employees are subject to the same employment requirements or restrictions, both may be said to have been granted the right to contract on equal terms. The Supreme Court stated in construing the constitutional guarantee of equal protection: “[W]e have difficulty understanding how a law establishing racially neutral qualifications for employment is nevertheless racially discriminatory and denies `any person . . . equal protection of the laws’ simply because a greater proportion of Negroes fail to qualify than members of other racial or ethnic groups.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 245, 96 S.Ct. at 2050. We confront this same difficulty in construing section 1981’s similar guarantee of the “same right . . . to make and enforce contracts.”

“The thirteenth amendment prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude. From its first interpretation by the Supreme Court, the amendment has been construed to grant to Congress the “power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery.” Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20, 3 S.Ct. at 28. Much more recently, the Court has declared that “Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation.” Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 2203, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968) (Congress has power under thirteenth amendment to prohibit private as well as public discrimination).”

Source: Croker v. Boeing Co. 662 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1981)

“In Waters the Seventh Circuit was faced with the same contention and held that “a right to sue under § 1981 for `private’ racial discrimination in employment existed prior to 1964.Plaintiffs argue by analogy to the Jones case that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is also derived from section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866; that it is a valid exercise of congressional power under the thirteenth amendment; and that it is intended to prohibit private racial discrimination in employment by companies and unions. We agree.”

“Refusing to extend Section 1985 to Fourteenth Amendment claim of racial discrimination based on arbitrary business discrimination by corporate landlord and its agents against lawyer engaged in practice of criminal law when there is no evidence of state involvement in the alleged discrimination. The statute construed in Jones entitles all citizens to the same rights as possessed by white citizens, whereas the 1964 Act broadly prohibits racial discrimination. The Adickes case was predicated on a denial of equal protection, because there was state involvement, under § 1983(2) and (3), which eliminated the “rights enjoyed by whites” problem with the language of §§ 1981 and 1982. Plaintiff relies heavily on Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142. The language in Jones lends some support to plaintiff. The Court said, id. at 421, 88 S.Ct. at 2194, ” § 1982 appears to prohibit all discrimination against Negroes in the sale or rental of property” (italics the Court’s). It added, however, ” — discrimination by private owners as well as discrimination by public authorities,” which would indicate that, by “all,” it meant public or private. It said, id. at 426, 88 S.Ct. at 2196, that the section “was meant to prohibit all racially motivated deprivations. . . .” (Italics the Court’s.) In context, however, that “all” also appears to refer to public and private. And in another reference, id. at 437, 80 S.Ct. at 2202, the Court said § 1982 purports “to prohibit all racial discrimination, private and public, in the sale and rental of property.” The Court proceeded to find the authority of Congress to enact § 1982 in the Thirteenth Amendment. If plaintiff’s version of the facts is correct, he was discriminated against not because of his race but because of the race of his clients. The 1964 Act’s broad prohibitions are founded, essentially, on the interstate commerce power. If that Act does not apply, whether either the Thirteenth or the Fourteenth Amendment can be read as giving Congress the broad power to prohibit indirect or “associational” racial discrimination by private parties under either § 1981 or § 1982, and whether, even if Congress had the power, it used the proper words to exercise it, are difficult questions which we decline to decide on the record before us. Our opinion in Waters, supra, n. 22, is, of course, not determinative because there the question was one of discrimination because of the race of the litigants, not because of the race of their associates.

Source: Dombrowski v. Dowling 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972)

Holding that “Jews count as a ‘race’ under certain civil rights statutes enacted pursuant to Congress’s power under the Thirteenth Amendment”. U.S. v. Nelson 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002) The Supreme Court overruled Hodges and established this broader account of the enforcement power in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968). Jones involved a plaintiff who sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 against defendants who had refused to sell him a house for the sole reason that he was black. The Supreme Court held that, as a matter of statutory construction, § 1982 “bars all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property, and that the statute, thus construed, is a valid exercise of the power of Congress [under Section Two] to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.” Id. at 413, 88 S.Ct. 2186. Furthermore, the Court found that the authority of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment “include[s] the power to eliminate all racial barriers to the acquisition of real and personal property.” Id. at 439, 88 S.Ct. 2186. Critically, the Court reached this conclusion while insisting that it need not decide the scope of the direct prohibitions contained in Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment because Section Two “clothed `Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.'” Id. at 439, 88 S.Ct. 2186 (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20, 3 S.Ct. 18). And most significantly, the Court noted, “[s]urely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation.” Jones, 392 U.S. at 440, 88 S.Ct. 2186. Finally, the Court expressly stated that, to the extent it was inconsistent with these pronouncements, Hodges was overruled. Id. at 443 n. 78, 88 S.Ct. 2186. 

Source: U.S. v. Nelson 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002)

Section 1981 was adopted as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, and then reenacted by the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 144. It was adopted pursuant to authority granted under the Thirteenth Amendment. It relates primarily to racial discrimination in the making and enforcing of contracts. Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459, 95 S.Ct. at 1719.

Source: McAlester v. United Air Lines, Inc. 851 F.2d 1249 (10th Cir. 1988)

“The scope of the thirteenth amendment was broadened dramatically when the Supreme Court expanded the definition of what conduct could constitute “badges and incidents of slavery.” Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968). The Court found that the thirteenth amendment could be interpreted broadly enough to prohibit private racial discrimination in real estate transactions. Further, when enacting legislation to enforce the amendment, Congress has the power “rationally to determine what are the badges and incidents of slavery.” Id. at 440, 88 S.Ct. at 2203. While the thirteenth amendment has been broadened to prohibit a wider range of conduct, it clearly does not encompass a situation where an individual is paid for services willingly performed. The complaint merely alleges that the minors performed tasks for the counselors to earn money to afford an abortion. There are no allegations that the minors performed the tasks unwillingly or involuntarily. Thus, the trial court properly dismissed this claim where the complaint alleged nothing to indicate involuntary servitude was even remotely involved.”

“Declining to consider scope of § 1981 because plaintiffs adequately stated constitutional discrimination claim under § 1983. The scope of the thirteenth amendment was broadened dramatically when the Supreme Court expanded the definition of what conduct could constitute “badges and incidents of slavery.” Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968). The Court found that the thirteenth amendment could be interpreted broadly enough to prohibit private racial discrimination in real estate transactions. Further, when enacting legislation to enforce the amendment, Congress has the power “rationally to determine what are the badges and incidents of slavery.” Id. at 440, 88 S.Ct. at 2203. While the thirteenth amendment has been broadened to prohibit a wider range of conduct, it clearly does not encompass a situation where an individual is paid for services willingly performed. The complaint merely alleges that the minors performed tasks for the counselors to earn money to afford an abortion. There are no allegations that the minors performed the tasks unwillingly or involuntarily. Thus, the trial court properly dismissed this claim where the complaint alleged nothing to indicate involuntary servitude was even remotely involved.”

Source: Arnold v. Board of Education of Escambia County 880 F.2d 305 (11th Cir. 1989

“Although Justice Harlan’s interpretation closely reflected the intent of the drafters of the thirteenth amendment, that interpretation went unheeded for 85 years. Eventually it was vindicated by the Supreme Court in Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 1968, 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189. In Jones v. Mayer, the Supreme Court affirmed the power of Congress, based on the thirteenth amendment, to prohibit all racial discrimination in the sale and rental of property. Id. at 437-44, 88 S.Ct. at 2202-05. The Court held that “Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation.” Id. at 440, 88 S.Ct. at 2203. Under the Jones v. Mayer rationale, current forms of racial discrimination are badges of slavery that may be proscribed under the thirteenth amendment if they are historically linked with slavery or involuntary servitude.”

Source: Williams v. City of New Orleans 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984)

In Clark, plaintiffs consisted of a class of home purchasers who claimed defendants exploited racial segregation in Chicago by selling property to black citizens at inflated prices compared to white counterparts buying similar properties. [T]hat § 1982 bars all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property, and that the statute, thus construed, is a valid exercise of the power of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment. 392 U.S. 413, 88 S.Ct. 2189 [Emphasis in original].

Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc. 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1974)

Boseski has not stated a claim against any defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, because she does not allege that any defendant’s actions were motivated by racial discrimination. See Brown v. Phillip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2001). Similarly, a claimant under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 must adequately allege both a conspiracy, and “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action,” Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)), which Boseski has not. Boseski v. N. Arlington Municipality 621 F. App’x 131 (3d Cir. 2015)

Kromnick v. School Dist, of Philadelphia 739 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1984) In Kromnick, the Philadelphia Board of Education sought to maintain a faculty ratio at each school of between 75% and 125% of the systemwide proportions of white and black teachers employed by the Board to ensure that the racial composition of each school’s faculty reflected that of the overall teaching staff. The Supreme Court signalled the beginning of the end of institutionalized racism in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). As the Court later stated, “School boards . . . were . . . clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.” Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 437-38, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 1693-94, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968) (citations omitted). Congress joined in the Court’s view of the invidiousness of racial discrimination and passed a series of laws, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964, outlawing discrimination in many areas. Racism, however, has not been eliminated, but the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution have been restored to their intended race-conscious and remedial function. “[N]o decision of [the Supreme] Court has ever adopted the proposition that the Constitution must be color blind.” Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 336, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 2771, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.). Rather, experience has taught us that “[i]n order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race.” Id. at 407, 98 S.Ct. at 2807 (separate opinion of Blackmun, J.). See also Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1573 (5th Cir. 1984) (in banc) (Wisdom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Section 1981 reflects “Congress’s intent to enact sweeping legislation implementing the 13th Amendment to abolish all the remaining vestiges of the slavery system.” Brown v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 796 (3rd Cir. 2001); see also Mahone v. Waddell, 564 F.2d 1018, 1030 (3rd Cir. 1977). Its aim is to “remove the impediment of discrimination from a minority citizen’s ability to participate fully and equally in the marketplace.” Bobbitt v. Rage, Inc., 19 F. Supp.2d 512, 516 (W.D.N.C. 1998) (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 170, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989)). It therefore applies to retail transactions as well as to formal contracts. Hampton v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 247 F.3d 1091, 1102 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1131, 122 S.Ct. 1071, 151 L.Ed.2d 973 (2002). As its legislative history reveals, “in amending section 1981 [in 1991] Congress reaffirmed the view that section 1981 is `a critically important tool used to strike down racially discriminatory practices in a broad variety of contexts.'” Callwood v. Dave Buster’s, Inc., 98 F. Supp.2d 694, 703 (D.Md. 2000) (quoting H.Rep. No. 102-40, pt. II, at 36 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 729 (Report of House Judiciary Committee on Civil Rights Act of 1991)). Turner v. Wong 363 N.J. Super. 186 (N.J. Super. 2003)

“It [the Fourteenth Amendment] was designed to assured to the colored race the enjoyment of all the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by white persons, and to give to that race the protection of the general government, in that enjoyment, whenever it should be denied by the States. It not only gave citizenship and the privileges of citizenship to persons of color, but it denied to any State the power to withhold from them the equal protection of the laws, and authorized Congress to enforce its provisions by appropriate legislation. . . . It ordains that no State shall make or enforce any laws which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. . . . It ordains that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their color?. . . Buchanan v. Warley 245 U.S. 60 (1917)

But we deal here with a classification based upon the race of the participants, which must be viewed in light of the historical fact that the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the States. This strong policy renders racial classifications “constitutionally suspect,” Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499; and subject to the “most rigid scrutiny,” Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216; and “in most circumstances irrelevant” to any constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100. Thus it is that racial classifications have been held invalid in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Virginia Board of Elections v. Hamm, 379 U.S. 19 (designation of race in voting and property records); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (designation of race on nomination papers and ballots); Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (segregation in public parks and playgrounds); Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (segregation in public schools). McLaughlin v. Florida 379 U.S. 184 (1964)

The burden of proof in Title VIII cases is governed by the concept of the “prima facie case.” Williams v. Matthews Co., supra 499 F.2d [819] at 826 [(8th Cir. 1974)]. To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the plaintiff need prove no more than that the conduct of the defendant actually or predictably results in racial discrimination; in other words, that it has a discriminatory effect. See id; United Farmworkers of Florida Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 808 (5th Cir. 1974); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, Mississippi, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc); Kennedy Park Homes Ass’n v. City of Lackawanna, supra 436 F.2d at 114; Dailey v. City of Lawton, Oklahoma, 425 F.2d 1037, 1039 (10th Cir. 1970); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931 (2nd Cir. 1968). The plaintiff need make no showing whatsoever that the action resulting in racial discrimination in housing [footnote omitted] was racially motivated. [footnote omitted] See Williams v. Matthews Co., supra 499 F.2d at 826; United Farmworkers of Florida Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, supra 493 F.2d [799] at 808 [(5th Cir. 1974)]; Kennedy Park Homes Ass’n v. City of Lackawanna, supra 436 F.2d at 114; Citizens Committee for Faraday Wood v. Lindsay, supra 362 F. Supp. [651] at 658 [(S.D.N.Y. 1973)]; Banks v. Perk, supra 341 F. Supp. [1175] at 1180 [(N.D. Ohio 1972)]. Effect, and not motivation, is the touchstone, in part because clever men may easily conceal their motivations, but more importantly,.. Urban League v. Tp. Committee 222 N.J. Super. 131 (N.J. Super. 1987)

Racial discrimination in state-operated schools is barred by the Constitution and “[i]t is also axiomatic that a state may not induce, encourage or promote private persons to accomplish what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish.” Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 267 F. Supp. 458, 475-476 (MD Ala. 1967).

Holding that “[e]vidence of historical discrimination is relevant to drawing an inference of purposeful discrimination” Rogers v. Lodge 458 U.S. 613 (1982)

To fulfill their goal of ending racial discrimination and to prevent direct or indirect state legislative encroachment on the rights guaranteed by the amendments, the Framers gave Congress power to enforce each of the Civil War Amendments. These enforcement powers are broad. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968), the Court held that § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment “clothed `Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.'” Oregon v. Mitchell 400 U.S. 112 (1970)

In Campbell, the Supreme Court held that defendants have standing to challenge racial discrimination in the composition of the grand jury used to indict them. Although Campbell addresses race alone, Henley contends that this rule extends to gender-based claims as well. Regardless of his or her skin color, the accused suffers a significant injury in fact when the composition of the grand jury is tainted by racial discrimination. “[D]iscrimination on the basis of race in the selection of members of a grand jury . . . strikes at the fundamental values of our judicial system” because the grand jury is a central component of the criminal justice process. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979). Campbell v. Louisiana 523 U.S. 392 (1998)

Holding that racial discrimination in the selection of grand jurors violated criminal defendant’s equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Rose v. Mitchell 443 U.S. 545 (1979)

Concluding that a person of Arab background could state a claim for racial discrimination under Section 1981. Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College

Finding that racial discrimination had the effect of discouraging travel on substantial part of black community, thus empowering Congress to enact appropriate legislation barring racial discrimination. Atlanta Motel v. United States 379 U.S. 241 (1964)

Congress also enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1976 ed., Supp. IV) in part to implement the commands of the Thirteenth Amendment. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104-105 (1971). While holding that § 1985(3) does not require state action but also reaches private conspiracies, we have emphasized that a violation of the statute requires “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Id., at 102.

Holding that a private party that engaged in racial discrimination as part of a state-enforced custom would be a state actor for purposes of § 1983 The state-action doctrine reflects the profound judgment that denials of equal treatment, and particularly denials on account of race or color, are singularly grave when government has or shares responsibility for them. Government is the social organ to which all in our society look for the promotion of liberty, justice, fair and equal treatment, and the setting of worthy norms and goals for social conduct. Therefore something is uniquely amiss in a society where the government, the authoritative oracle of community values, involves itself in racial discrimination. Accordingly, in the cases that have come before us this Court has condemned significant state involvement in racial discrimination, however subtle and indirect it may have been and whatever form it may have taken. See, e. g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra; Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). These decisions represent vigilant fidelity to the constitutional principle that no State shall in any significant way lend its authority to the sordid business of racial discrimination. Adickes v. Kress Co. 398 U.S. 144 (1970)

“Holding that decisionmaker’s alleged use of term “boy” to refer to African-American employees was evidence of discriminatory animus” Ash v. Tyson Foods 546 U.S. 454 (2006)