“Substantial interest is a term that applies in many contexts and often isn’t capable of a precise definition. It may be defined as a percentage of ownership, but may be more generally used to mean an interest that is not remote or nominal and affects a proprietary or pecuniary interest. The following is an example of a school board’s definition of substantial interest, in the context of a conflict of interests: Definition of substantial interest: Any interest that is not a remote interest as defined by law and university policy. Substantial interests generally involve pecuniary or proprietary interests. For example: * Substantial interest in stock would be ownership of more than 3% of the shares of a company and/or more than 5% of your income is derived from this interest. * If you work in the area of scholarships and have a son or daughter applying for a scholarship, you may not serve on the committee that reviews your child’s application.”
Source: Substantial Interest Law and Legal Definition
Also review 29 CFR § 4.12 – Substantial interest proceedings.
“person who has a substantial interest in the company , in relation to a company, means a person who is the beneficial owner of shares, not being shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend whether with or without a right to participate in profits, carrying not less than twenty per cent of the voting power ; Sample 1 Based on 1 documents”
Source: Definition of person who has a substantial interest in the company
“Holding that a city’s substantial interest in limiting sound volume was satisfactorily “evidenced by the complaints about excessive volume generated by respondent’s past concerts.” We think it also apparent that the city’s interest in ensuring the sufficiency of sound amplification at bandshell events is a substantial one. The record indicates that inadequate sound amplification has had an adverse affect on the ability of some audiences to hear and enjoy performances at the bandshell. The city enjoys a substantial interest in ensuring the ability of its citizens to enjoy whatever benefits the city parks have to offer, from amplified music to silent meditation. See Community for Creative Non-Violence, supra, at 296. Ward v. Rock Against Racism 491 U.S. 781 (1989)
“But abuses of the Rules by litigants, and sometimes the inadequate oversight of discovery by trial courts, do not in any respect lessen the importance of discovery in civil litigation and the government’s substantial interest in protecting the integrity of the discovery process.” Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart 467 U.S. 20 (1984)
“Recognizing that California had a substantial interest in protecting citizens from outrageous conduct. The State, on the other hand, has a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from the kind of abuse of which Hill complained. That interest is no less worthy of recognition because it concerns protection from emotional distress caused by outrageous conduct, rather than protection from physical injury, as in Russell, or damage to reputation, as in Linn. Although recognition of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is a comparatively recent development in state law, see W. Prosser, Law of Torts, § 12, pp. 49-50, 56 (4th ed. 1971), our decisions permitting the exercise of state jurisdiction in tort actions based on violence or defamation have not rested on the history of the tort at issue, but rather on the nature of the State’s interest in protecting the health and well-being of its citizens.” Farmer v. Carpenters 430 U.S. 290 (1977)
“In conclusion, we find that because of the Government’s substantial interest in assuring the continuing availability of issued Selective Service certificates, because amended § 462(b) is an appropriately narrow means of protecting this interest and condemns only the independent noncommunicative impact of conduct within its reach, and because the noncommunicative impact of O’Brien’s act of burning his registration certificate frustrated the Government’s interest, a sufficient governmental interest has been shown to justify O’Brien’s conviction.” United States v. O’Brien 391 U.S. 367 (1968)
Holding city has substantial interest in “preserving the quality of life in the community at large” Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 475 U.S. 41 (1986)
Holding that privacy and maintaining ethical standards in state-licensed professions were substantial interests.At prior stages of this litigation, the Bar asserted a different interest, in addition to that urged now, in protecting people against undue influence and overreaching. See 21 F.3d, at 1042-1043; cf. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Assn., 486 U.S. 466, 474-476 (1988); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 462 (1978). Because the Bar does not press this interest before us, we do not consider it. Of course, our precedents do not require the Bar to point to more than one interest in support of its 30-day restriction; a single substantial interest is sufficient to satisfy Central Hudson’s first prong. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995) (deeming only one of the government’s proffered interests “substantial”). Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. 515 U.S. 618 (1995)
Holding that preventing fraud, maintaining ethical standards, and privacy were substantial interests. Edenfield v. Fane 507 U.S. 761 (1993)
“For similar reasons, we reject the Board’s alternative argument that the solicitation ban is a reasonable restriction on the manner in which CPA’s may communicate with prospective clients, rather than a direct regulation of the commercial speech itself. Assuming that a flat ban on commercial solicitation could be regarded as a content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction on speech, a proposition that is open to serious doubt, see, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S., at 771, a challenged restriction of that type still must serve a substantial state interest in “a direct and effective way,” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989). The State has identified certain interests in regulating solicitation in the accounting profession that are important and within its legitimate power, but the prohibitions here do not serve these purposes in a direct and material manner. Where a restriction on speech lacks this close and substantial relation to the governmental interests asserted, it cannot be, by definition, a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction.” Edenfield v. Fane 507 U.S. 761 (1993)
“The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, although on different grounds. The Court of Appeals determined that it did not have to reach the District Court’s decision that the Los Angeles ordinance was content based because, even if the ordinance were content neutral, the city failed to present evidence upon which it could reasonably rely to demonstrate that its regulation of multiple-use establishments is “designed to serve” the city’s substantial interest in reducing crime. The challenged ordinance was therefore invalid under Renton, 475 U.S. 41. 222 F.3d, at 723-724. We granted certiorari, 532 U.S. 902 (2001), to clarify the standard for determining whether an ordinance serves a substantial government interest under Renton, supra.” City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc. 535 U.S. 425 (2002)
“Holding that due process is violated where judge has “direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest” in convicting. All questions of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest, would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion. Wheeling v. Black, 25 W. Va. 266, 270. But it certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law, to subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case.”
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