“It comes down on its face to a very plain admonition: “Do not be technical, where technicality does not really hurt the party whose rights in the trial and in its outcome the technicality affects.” Kotteakos v. United States 328 U.S. 750 (1946)Explaining that except in the case of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant bears the burden of showing that the error affected a substantial right. State v. Ramey 721 N.W.2d 294 (Minn. 2006)
Indeed, interpretations of the 1919 statute accorded it a very different mission. As Justice Frankfurter explained in refusing to require a showing of prejudice to justify reversal for a statutory violation: “Suffice it to indicate, what every student of the history behind the Act of February 26, 1919, knows, that that Act was intended to prevent matters concerned with the mere etiquette of trials and with the formalities and minutiae of procedure from touching the merits of a verdict.” Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939). United States v. Lane 474 U.S. 438 (1986)
A “structural” error, we explained in Arizona v. Fulminante, is a “defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself,” 499 U.S., at 310. We have found structural errors only in a very limited class of cases: See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (a total deprivation of the right to counsel); Tumey v. Ohio , 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (lack of an impartial trial judge); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (unlawful exclusion of grand jurors of defendant’s race); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (the right to self-representation at trial); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (the right to a public trial); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) (erroneous reasonable-doubt instruction to jury). Johnson v. United States 520 U.S. 461 (1997)
Holding that we review unobjected-to arguments to determine whether there was plain error that affected appellant’s substantial rights State v. Griller 583 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1998) Cf. Murdoch, 398 F.3d at 498 (concluding that complete omission in Rule 11 colloquy affected defendant’s substantial rights. U.S. v. Goodson 544 F.3d 529 (3d Cir. 2008)
Finding application of erroneous Guidelines range affects defendant’s substantial rights U.S. v. Knight 266 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2001) States v. Maynie, 257 F.3d 908, 2001 WL 856142, at *8 (8th Cir. July 30, 2001) (finding “that greater, and improper, infringement of defendants’ liberty substantially affected their rights” ); Turning to the issue of whether the plain error affected substantial rights, we recognized that “`[t]he Fifth Amendment right to be free from duplicative prosecutions and punishment is a hallmark of American jurisprudence.'” Id. (quoting United States v. Jackson, 443 F.3d 293, 301 (3d Cir. 2006))
Holding that, under Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740, and Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 116 S.Ct. 1241, 134 L.Ed.2d 419, improper conviction affected defendant’s substantial rights. Direct TV, Inc. v. Delaney, No. 03-C-3444, 2003 WL 24232530, at *5 (N.D.Ill. Nov.20, 2003) (same); Berry v. III. Dep’t of Human Servs., No. 00-C-5538, 2001 WL 111035, at *18 (N.D.Ill. Feb.2, 2001) (avoiding “a dismissal prejudicing a substantial right” by severing claims and tolling the statute of limitations for complaints refiled “within a reasonable period of time”); Franconia Assocs. v. United States, 61 Fed.Cl. 335, 337 (Fed.Cl.2004)
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